A draft for the eventual chapter:
https://www.academia.edu/43544903/Dum_Dum_Bullets_in_December_1989_09222019tk3_post

This probably explains why, during the brief first window in early 1990 discussed earlier in this paper, scattered USLA personnel—sometimes identified as USLA, sometimes identified by their new rank reflecting their integration into the Ministry of National Defense at the end of December 1989—turned up in the press to discuss the characteristics of the weapons and ballistics used by the so-called terrorists.  For example, a former USLA officer referred to as an Army Major engineer specializing in weapons and ammunition[1] described for a Bucharest daily in late March 1990 ‘soft-nosed bullets,’ in other words, colloquially, dum-dum bullets:

‘Kynoch-Magnum’ cartridges were found in Buzău, but also around Television and it appears a ‘sample’ was discovered in the area around the former CC building.[2]

The bullet is of the ‘Softnosed’ type, which in translation means ‘with a soft nose,’ which means that when the bullet hits its target, the head of the bullet deforms radially, which produces deep wounds at entry.  It is not a penetrating bullet that remains in the place it struck, but provokes a wound of categorical lethality.  The bullet has a lead core which is in a jacket of tombac, a mixture based on copper.

The appearance of these cartridges proves that in Romania there also existed similar hunting rifles…in the stocks of our armed forces there did not exist such a weapon…the ‘Kynoch-Magnmum’ cartridges remain foreign, through their shiny appearance on the streets of the Capital, alongside the whole ‘collection’ of bullets gathered by military teams that policed the underground tunnels of Bucharest.[3] (Alexandrescu 1990b)

[1]Ion Ştefanut was the USLA officer in question. He was interviewed in Horia Alexandrescu, ‘Gloanţele, pe ȋntelesul tuturor (I).  Cartuşe pentru…Elefanţi!’ Tineretul Liber, 25 March 1990. Significantly, the series, ‘Bullets, for Everyone’s Understanding,’ appears to have ended abruptly and without any explanation, after the second episode three days later, even though Alexandrescu had promised a future episode would discuss the so-called, unconventional ‘vidia bullets.’ The section of the article quoted above originally appeared in Perva and Roman 1991, pp. 103-104.  Members of the Securitate’s ‘Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare’ (U.S.L.A.) who were not activated as part of the offensive actions of the Ceauşescu resistance plan and did not participate in such a capacity, were willing in the early months of 1990 to give details in public about the Securitate ‘terrorists.’ Naturally, they were reasonably familiar with the weapons’ choices of those in the Ceauşescu resistance—some of whom were fellow USLA officers—and could comment knowledgably.  This was probably a way of proving their bona fides to the new regime, and the population, and also a way for the new regime to salvage and rebrand the ‘usable’ part of the former Securitate.

For example, Io[a]n Iliuţă and Major Ene Zaharia of the USLA appear to be the sources of the following revelation to Army Major Mihai Floca in early January 1990:  ‘Upon clearing out the houses surrounding the Television station, it was discovered, that from the staircases they were firing at the house of a writer.  Specialists of the unit [presumably the USLA] arrived at the conclusion that a 5.6 mm Heckler-Koch pistol with a cartridge that melts away for added impact was used.’ (Major Mihai Floca, ‘Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,’ Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p. 4.)

Iliuţă also showed up in the pages of the Army daily, Armata Poporului:  ‘How can we explain the amazing precision of the terrorist gunfire:  even though in the majority of cases, they operated at night, most victims were shot—mortally—in the head, throat, or heart?’ ‘To this question—which we took from letters and telephone calls received at the editorial office—responded major engineer Ion Iliuţă, specialist in antiterrorist warfare:  ‘Much has been said and written in the press about the infrared scopes of the terrorists.  The truth is that they possessed means of targeting that were even more sophisticated, more precise.  I am talking about a complex apparatus that possesses a laser marker and a light-amplifier of the LITTON variety…’ ‘Cum ocheau teroriştii?’ Armata Poporului, 3, 17 January 1990, p. 6.

[2] This may be the type of bullet presented to the camera in a video which shows civilians rummaging through materials and munitions removed from V-a Headquarters. See the video posted by ‘Tioluciano’ entitled ‘Sediului fostei DSS in data de 24 decembrie 1989’ at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cs3FxteH5uM.

[3] Part of their knowledge about these bullets apparently came from their role in ‘cleaning up’ after the ‘terrorists.’  Witness, for example, the comments of an employee of the Museum of National Art located in the old Royal Palace across from the CC building in central Bucharest. ‘The next day [23 December 1989] and over the following days I found bullets in the Museum.  They were not normal bullets.  They had a rounded head.  They appeared to have a lead jacket.  It was of a caliber between five, five something.  The USLAşi did not want to leave us a bullet.  I asked them to leave me at one as a memento.  They did not want to.  They said that they needed them for the purpose of identification.  They noted where they gathered them from.’  (Dan Iliescu, interview by Ion Zubaşcu, “Misterioasa revoluţie română,” Flacăra, 51, 19 December 1990, p. 11).

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/06/10/ora-0100-23-decembrie-1989-arad-seriilor-lungi-de-arme-automate-din-hotelul-parc-li-se-raspunde-din-cetate-cu-un-foc-intens-armata-poporului-martie-1990/

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/06/09/ana-nemeth-si-alexandra-aslan-hotel-parc-arad-22-23-decembrie-1989-de-la-etajele-superioare-se-tragea-adevarul-arad-31-ianuarie-1990/

Arad events in which Sandor Toth (Toth Sandor) who was transporting aid from Hungary was killed.

A harom magyar visszaindult, es Aradon megallva a Park Szallo elott benzint toltottek a gepkocsit.  Ekkor a szallo erkelyerol tuzet nyitottak rajuk a Securitate fegyveresei.

“The three Hungarians returned, stopping in Arad in front of Hotel Parc to fill their gas tank.  From the balcony of the hotel Securitate snipers opened fire on them.”

Vasarnapi Hirek, 24 december 1989

from the following 1:59:22 video posted Mr. Mudava (mudavaflex).  My thanks to my co-author, Andrei Ursu, for transcription of some of the scenes!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhEIImKwqJk

Decembrie 1989 – lupte grave (filmari furate de la S.R.I.)

6.39K subscribers

13:40-13:47 parabolica (‘se vede sapca’,…3 insi in combinezoane negre?… teroristii?) 11 am hour 23.12.1989 TvR

It is not clear, whose forces these are, and whether or not they are the “terrorists”…one thing that makes the latter possible, however, is what Nicolae Stefan Soucoup recounted in 1991 about the problem of the “terrorists” having infiltrated both the TVR courtyard (see the tragic case of the assassination Bogdan Serban Stan and the TVR tower, which I take to be a possible reference to the parabolica above):

Nicolae Stefan Soucoup, interview by Nicolae Tone, Tineretul Liber, 21 decembrie 1991, p. 3.

25:32 “un glont cu care trag dusmanii” (very clearly not a typical bullet)

see in relation:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-iii/

37:39 (terrorist propaganda leaflet) addressed to the young people to prevent the seizure of Transylvania by their enemies (i.e. Hungarians…the nationalist fallback of the Ceausescu regime)

from Andrei Ursu:

37:35 – Dusmanii v-au ademenit sa faceti rau tarii.

(Dreptatea, 3 octombrie 1991, p. 1)

In December 1990, in the pages of the anti-FSN PNTCD newspaper Dreptatea, Viorel Tocan recounted clearly that those who were shooting after 22 December 1989 in Brasov were Securitate cadre, and that they were ultimately reporting not to local authorities but Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad in Bucharest.

“‘Domnule colonel, noi nu te intrebam daca poti s-o faci, noi te intrebam daca vrei sa opresti macelul in Brasov, s-ti opresti oamenii sa mai traga.’  Col Bucur [Seful Securitatii] i-a raspuns ca nu depinde de el, sa-i opreasca cel care a declansat focul. S-a incercat atunci sa se ia legatura cu Vlad Iulian. Dupa circa o jumatate de ora de tergiversari, col. Bucur a lasat o lista cu 50-60 numere de telefon din Brasov iar el s-a dus la sediul securitatii.  La o ora, o ora si jumatate dupa aceea s-a oprit focul. O confirmare:  un maior care este si acum la garzi, era coleg cu mine, a inceput sa dea telefoane de acolo, din sediu.  La un moment dat a primit un telfon prin care era cautat gen. Zagoneanu [Sef Inspectoratului M.I.] sau col. Bucur, cel care telefona prezentindu-se drept un subordonat de al lor. Acest maior a raspuns ca nici ? era acolo ? si ca ? ? ? la telefon. Interlocutorul ? a intrebat atunci daca este adevarat (?) ca s-a dat ordin de incetare a focului, daca nu mai trebuie sa traga.”

“Brasovul in Zilele Revolutiei.  Din Unghiul Acesta–Interviu cu maior (in rezerva fortata) VIOREL TOCAN,” Dreptatea, 23 decembrie 1990, p. 3

http://www.corneliu-coposu.eu/articol/index.php/2161-dreptatea-anul-xxii-seria-a-iv-a-nr-269-duminica-23-decembrie-1990/

In the unsettled context of early 1990 (roughly January-March), Securitate officials, Interior Ministry (Police) officials, Military Prosecutors, and others were still willing to talk about the reality of the Securitate terrorists in December 1989.  What is significant is that the Securitate terrorists were talked about as “others,” as coming from the D.S.S. and M.I., but as not representing those institutions–of which the interlocutors were a part, and which they were now attempting to rehabilitate, out of personal and institutional interests.  However, in doing so, in seeking to distance themselves and the surviving institutional entities, they were admitting both the existence of the “terrorists” and the institutional affiliation/identity of the “terrorists.”  Below, five examples*:

General Maior Ghita Grigorie: “Trupele de securitate nu au nimic comun si nu pot fi confundate cu acele forte speciale de securitate si elemente teroriste care au fost pregatite in ascuns de dictator…pentru operatii de tip gherila urbana” (Adevarul, 19 ianuarie 1990)

Uluitoarea Tehnica a Teroristilor (Adevarul, 20 ianuarie 1990, p. 2)

Adjunctul Procurorului General, General Maior Gheorghe Diaconescu

In legatura cu campania terorista desfasurata intre 22 si 31 decembrie 1989 au fost retinute de fortele armate mult mai multe persoane suspecte decit numarul celor vinovati in mod real de actiuni de terorism.  Explicatia e simpla:  teroristii faceau parte din unitati si formatiuni specializate ale Ministerului de Interne…

Bucharest Police Chief Bitlan, FBIS EEU 90 013 (19 January 1990), pp. 68-69 (translated interview from Magyar Hirlap, 8 January 1990).

Nicolai Stanca and Maiorul Ion Iliuta (U.S.L.A.)

Maior Mihai Floca, “Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 ianuarie 1990, p. 4.

Ulterior au fost ,curatate’, ‘periate’ vilele din jurul Televiziunii, precum si cele situate pe Calea Dorobanti, pina la piata.  Din toate acestea nu s-a mai tras.  Cu acest prilej s-a descoperit ca de pe casa scarii, in zilele precedente, se executase foc asupra locuintei unui scriitor.  Specialistii unitatii au ajuns la concluzia ca s-a folosit un pistol Heckler-Koch, cal. 5,6 mm, cu tub cartus cu ardere, completa, ceea ce confera gloantelor o mare putere de patrundere…

Maiorul Ion Stefanut (USLA)

Horia Alexandrescu, “Cartuse pentru Elefanti!” Tineretul Liber, 25 martie 1990.

“Un capitol aparte privind mijloacele folosite il constituie cartusele cu care s-a tras in Revolutie, multe gloante gasite fiind cel putin ciudate, de provenienta straina. Intr-o ampla ancheta, “Tineretul Liber” incearca sa elucideze misterul gloantelor “ciudate” apelind la maiorul Ion Stefanut, inginer specialist in armament si munitie la M.Ap.N.

Cartuse de tip “Kynoch-Magnum” s-au gasit la Buzau, dar si in zona Televiziunii si se pare ca o “mostra” a mai fost depistata si in zona fostului c.c. Este produs de firma “Kyondi”, celalalt cuvint “Magnum” fiind o unitate de masura. Acest cartus are calibrul 9,5 mm sau 0,375 toli. Este un cartus de vinatoare pentru vinat mare si poate fi tras cu orice tip de carabina sau puscaa de calibru 9,5 care are o camera destinata unui astfel de gen de incarcatura. Este un cartus de mare putere, caracteristicele lui permitind ca un bun tintas sa loveasca perfect si mortal la o distanta de 1000 m, viteza initiala a glontului este de circa 850 m/s. Pulberea din cartus este, intr-adevar mai neobisnuita, dar deloc noua, avind in vedere ca se fabrica din anii 70. Este vorba de o pulbere sub forma de…macaroane, cu ardere constanta, care imprima glontului o viteza marita, determinind si o mica uzura a tevii. “Macaroanele” sint facute din nitroceluloza plastificata cu nitroglicerina. Glontul este de tip “Softnosed”, ceea ce in traducere ar insemna, “cu nasul moale”, adica la impactul cu tinta, virful glontului se deformeaza radial, ceea ce determina producerea de rani grave la intrare. Nu este un glont penetrant raminind pe loc, dar provocind o lovitura de categoric mortala. Glontul este un miez de plumb acoperit intr-o camasa de tombac, un aliaj pe baza de cupru.

Apartia cartuselor de acest tip dovedeste ca si la noi exista asemenea arme de vinatoare. In dotarea fortelor noastre armate nu exista o astfel de arma.

Cartusele “Kynoch-Magnum” ramin stranii, prin aparitia lor insolita pe strazile Capitalei, alaturi de intreaga “colectie” de gloante adunata de echipele militare care au curatat subteranele Bucurestiului si casele din care s-a tras….”

* PLEASE NOTE:  COPIED ARTICLES ORIGINALLY APPEARED AT https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/

Lt. Col (r.) “P. I.” (Securitatea-Filaj) cu Liviu Valenas, “Despre securitate (II), Baricada, nr. 10 (20 martie 1990), p. 3.

Discutia de fata a avut loc la hotel INTERCONTINENTAL Bucuresti, pe data de 19 februarie 1990, interlocutorul nostru a dorit sa-si pastreze anonimatul, initialele din textul de fata nu corespund numelui real…

P.I.  Locotenent-colonel, am lucrat la filaj.  Am 22 de ani vechime…Sint somer.  Pe data de 22 ianuarie 1990, printr-un ordin de zi al M.A.N. am fost trecut in rezerva, impreuna cu alte 5000 de cadre, numai in Bucuresti….

Liviu Valenas:  Dar, in parte, armata a ripostat unor tragatori indirjiti care trageau din diverse imobile.

P.I.  Erau montate in diverse imobile niste casete-melc, cu mare putere de amplificare, care simulau un tir intens si repetat.  Ele au fost montate pentru timorarea populatiei.  Armata nu avea cunostinta de ele, a tras cu toate gurile de foc impotriva unor tragatori inexistenti.  Au fost omoriti multi din greseala in aceste conditii, atit militari cit si civili.  Pe urma, Ceausescu a dispus de trupe speciale de teroristi, de a caror existenta nu am stiut nici noi.

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the (third) Mineriada (miners’ rampage) of June 1990 that brutally put to an end the marathon anti-FSN demonstrations in University Square (Piața Universității, 22 aprilie – 15 iunie 1990), Radio Europa Libera has released an interview from 25 May 1990 by Emil Hurezeanu with Rebeca Doina Cercel, who was at the time participating in the anti-Front, anti-Iliescu protests.  There is much in this interview to discuss, but that is for another time.  For now, here is the interview, plus some articles discussing Rebeca and her husband’s experiences in December 1989.  It is important to point out, Rebeca was virulently anti-Iliescu, yet she had no doubt about the very real existence and destruction wrought by the “terrorists”–which the military prosecutors now argue did not exist–in December 1989 (she remained on guard in the PCR CC building, until 16 February 1990!).  Sadly, it appears both Rebeca and her husband died in near poverty in the mid-late 1990s sometime.

Gheorghe Zainea (“Jilava, 21-22 decembrie 1989”):  “Mai suntem îndureraţi că revoluţionari de-ai noştri, care au luptat în decembrie 1989 şi au luptat şi în anii următori de după revoluţie, au murit. Unii, precum Rebeca Cercel şi Lazăr Cercel, au murit în sărăcie, dar ultimul lor cuvânt a fost: “luptaţi!” Şi vom lupta pentru bunăstarea acestei naţiuni.”  (Şedinţa solemnă comună a Camerei Deputaţilor şi Senatului din 22 decembrie 1998, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?idl=1&idm=1&ids=5022)

You can listen to the interview here:
https://romania.europalibera.org/a/ultimul-reportaj-transmis-de-emil-hurezeanu-din-pia%C8%9Ba-universit%C4%83%C8%9Bii-25-mai-1990-arhiva-podcast-radio-europa-libera/30633168.html

the following are reproduced from:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/27/doi-revolutionari-doua-destine-1-500-000-dolari-c-c-emanatii-revolutiei-si-alte-articole-despre-rebeca-doina-cercel-si-revolutia-din-1989/

“In noaptea de 23 se reintorc in framintate zona a fostului cc.  In corpul A. Rebeca este impuscata in ambele picioare.  Este transportata la Spitalul Municipal.  I se extrase unul dintre gloante si revine in acele locuri tulburi.  In fata Directii a 5-a.  Eugen Cercel este impuscat cu doua gloante explozive care i-au zdrobit bazinul si picioarele.  Este invalid pe viata, si in carutul sa, se afla la mama sa in Moldova...”

Emil Munteanu, “Doi revolutionari [Rebeca Doina Cercel si Cazimir Benedict Ionescu], doua destine…” Romania Libera, 20 februarie 1992, p. 1.

11 January 1990

Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi.  Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….

Mihai Barbulescu, “Teroristi infiltrati in rindurile revolutionarilor,” Expres Magazin, nr. 21, 1991, p. 11.

see also,

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/25/rebeca-doina-cercel-revolutionar-cc-pcr-decembrie-1989-erau-intr-adevar-dosare-pe-care-era-scris-strict-secret-si-in-care-am-vazut-ca-erau-mentionate-bazele-de-antrenament-antiterorist/

Rebeca Doina Cercel cu Traian Calin Uba, “1.500.000 dolari–C.C.–Emanatii ‘Revolutiei’” Contrast (Constanta), nr. 9 (49) 8-14 martie 1991, pp. 4-5.

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/06/09/ana-nemeth-si-alexandra-aslan-hotel-parc-arad-22-23-decembrie-1989-de-la-etajele-superioare-se-tragea-adevarul-arad-31-ianuarie-1990/

Ora 01,00 (23 decembrie 1989, Arad)

“Seriilor lungi de arme automate din hotelul ,Parc’ li se raspunde din ,Cetate’ cu un foc intens.”

Maiorul Alexandru Chis, ” 22-24 decembrie 1989″ Armata Poporului, nr. 11 (14 martie 1990), p. 3.

…domnisoara Alexandra Aslan, tinar locotenent de securitate, detasat recent la Arad…locuia in ,Parcul’ mic:…“De la etajele superioare se tragea cu arme automate, dar nu cu arme din dotarea armatei sau M.I…”

Doamna Ana Nemeth, receptionera de serviciu:  “pe la ora cinci [23 decembrie], de la unul dintre etajele superioare s-a auzit un foc puternic de arma automata inspre parcare….”

T. Petruti, “Dupa primul glont.  Va spunem tot ce am aflat!” Adevarul (Arad), 31 ianuarie 1990, p. 1; 3.

https://digitizare.bibliotecaarad.ro/lod/files/original/00a1f43ca7f83e5140a13f66469c0eb447189544.pdf

AN UPDATE from Mihai Demetriade on my FB page:  Mihai clarifies that his conclusions refer strictly to a subset (16) of Securitate “safe houses” (“case de lucru”) in Braila, saying he and his wife’s research did not look at the perhaps additional dozens of “safe houses” which were “case de intalniri,” about which he speculates that “very probably they were used in December 1989.”

With this in mind, the information I add below should be viewed rather as supplemental to the Demetriades’ research.  I myself cannot link any identified safe house of these 16 concretely to any specific incidence of gunfire in Braila, so I accept the Demetriades’ research as such.  What I do present are cases where gunfire did take place, and to which the Securitate likely had access, and may well have had “case de intilniri.”  Below, the original text.

——————————————————————————————————————–

CNSAS researchers Oana and Mihai Demetriade have uncovered a subset of “case conspirative”–16 to be exact, per the following article–in the center of the Romanian city of Braila.  It is admirable work.  Where their conclusions go awry is their effort to discuss what happened in December 1989.  Mihai tells the interviewer:  “at this time there does not exist direct evidence of a cause and effect variety” that there was gunfire from these “safe houses” in December 1989.  Instead, he suggests that there exists “circumstantial evidence that these places were used in that period.”  Later, he expands that this might have been just to use them as places of escape/”refuge” “out of fear” and that they could have been the “source of diverse actions.”

True, Demetriade does not say that there were no Securitate terrorists in December 1989, nor that the Securitate definitely did not use these “safe houses” for “diverse actions” (presumably one would conclude, that shooting might be one of those “diverse actions”), but he subtly leaves the impression through his strict constructionalism, that there is no proof that the Securitate shot from “safe houses” in December 1989, based on a subset of 16 listed official safe houses in central Braila in December 1989.  (It isn’t clear what Demetriade is expecting as evidence.  Unless he has access to a full list of all Securitate safe houses, including those to be used in preparation for and the event of the lupta de rezistenta , and can cross-check things with the early (1990) eyewitness testimonies and reconstructions by military prosecutors in the terrorist files, it would be pretty hard to conclude that nobody opened fire from safe houses in Braila.)  Before turning to his specific discussion in the article/interview, it is worth looking at a few broader related issues:

In December 1990, in the pages of the anti-FSN PNTCD newspaper Dreptatea, Viorel Tocan recounted clearly that those who were shooting after 22 December 1989 in Brasov were Securitate cadre, and that they were ultimately reporting not to local authorities but Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad in Bucharest.  Let’s take a guess, that at least some of the 50 to 60 phone numbers on the list were from “case conspirative.”

“‘Domnule colonel, noi nu te intrebam daca poti s-o faci, noi te intrebam daca vrei sa opresti macelul in Brasov, s-ti opresti oamenii sa mai traga.’  Col Bucur [Seful Securitatii] i-a raspuns ca nu depinde de el, sa-i opreasca cel care a declansat focul. S-a incercat atunci sa se ia legatura cu Vlad Iulian. Dupa circa o jumatate de ora de tergiversari, col. Bucur a lasat o lista cu 50-60 numere de telefon din Brasov iar el s-a dus la sediul securitatii.  La o ora, o ora si jumatate dupa aceea s-a oprit focul. O confirmare:  un maior care este si acum la garzi, era coleg cu mine, a inceput sa dea telefoane de acolo, din sediu.  La un moment dat a primit un telfon prin care era cautat gen. Zagoneanu [Sef Inspectoratului M.I.] sau col. Bucur, cel care telefona prezentindu-se drept un subordonat de al lor. Acest maior a raspuns ca nici ? era acolo ? si ca ? ? ? la telefon. Interlocutorul ? a intrebat atunci daca este adevarat (?) ca s-a dat ordin de incetare a focului, daca nu mai trebuie sa traga.”

“Brasovul in Zilele Revolutiei.  Din Unghiul Acesta–Interviu cu maior (in rezerva fortata) VIOREL TOCAN,” Dreptatea, 23 decembrie 1990, p. 3

http://www.corneliu-coposu.eu/articol/index.php/2161-dreptatea-anul-xxii-seria-a-iv-a-nr-269-duminica-23-decembrie-1990/

Moreover, even in Braila, we have the transcript of intercepted Securitate and Militia personnel on the night of 24/25 December 1989 discussing firing on and eluding the ‘adversary,’ the Army:

To my knowledge, these transcripts first got national coverage in the articles of Lt. Col. Fanica Voinea Ene in 1991 in Libertatea (Braila) and Armata Romaniei.  Interestingly, in spring-summer 1990, for example, Lt. Col. Fanica Voinea Ene, wrote columns on the Army in the same PNTCD opposition daily, Dreptatea.
———————————————————————————————————

Mihai Demetriade interview:

https://pressone.ro/casele-conspirative-ale-securitatii-din-braila-complicitati-coruptie-si-santaj?fbclid=IwAR1OlNGxu99Og-oUSo4ESivoI5oPETfc5d8kxeEo0idXGgXIbTVt6aYHKew

În timp ce munceau la o cercetare legată de crimele din zilele Revoluției din Brăila (42 de morți și peste 100 de răniți), au vrut să verifice legendele potrivit cărora s-ar fi tras în mulțime și din unele case conspirative folosite de Securitate. Așa au făcut un studiu separat dedicat acestora.

– Aveți dovezi că din unele din aceste case s-a tras în timpul zilelor Revoluției din Brăila?

M.D: – Nu există nicio dovadă directă la momentul acesta de tip cauză-efect. În schimb, există dovezi circumstanțiale că aceste locuințe au fost folosite în perioada aceea.

Efectivul Securității Brăila era, în decembrie 1989, în jur de 140 de cadre, în toate departamentele.

Se produc evenimentele din 22 decembrie.

Una dintre primele acțiuni ale revoluționarilor a fost să meargă la inspectoratul județean să-i aresteze pe securiști. Acolo au găsit niște ofițeri care, dintr-un motiv sau altul, au preferat să se baricadeze în sediu.

Numărul acestor ofițeri arestați atunci și duși la penitenciarul Brăila variază de la declarație la declarație. Știu din surse controlabile că o bună parte din ofițerii de Securitate ai județenei locale au dispărut în momentele respective.

De exemplu, șeful Securității Brăila, lt.col. Constantin Soare, a dispărut, nu a fost găsit în 22 decembrie.

Adjunctul sefului Securității, maior Savu Cerbureanu, a dispărut și el.

Soare a apărut abia pe 24 decembrie, când a fost arestat. Așa s-a întâmplat cu mai mulți ofițeri care au dispărut pur și simplu.

Există mai multe alte argumente conexe care te îndeptățesc să crezi că au folosit, s-au refugiat în aceste case, unele dintre ele considerate safe.

E plauzibil, nu există probe directe, în contextele critice de atunci, din frică, să fi fost folosite aceste case fie ca adăpost, fie ca sursă a unor diverse acțiuni.

Let us take one of the safe houses identified by the Demetriades, from the address entered into the map in the above article, Calea Calarasilor 55, right in the area where there was much gunfire upon key targets and personnel during these days.  The military was quite detailed in listing these:

The Romarta bloc is mentioned often in eyewitness accounts.  Its address, is Calea Calarasilor 52, exact vis-a-vis, on the opposite corner from the address given for the safe house.  This could all be just a coincidence of course, although if I were arguing that the Securitate’s safe house may have just been used for “refuge…out of fear” I might find it a little too close for comfort for my liking.

Armata Romaniei, nr. 41 (96) 9-15 octombrie 1991 p. 3

Lt. Col. Fanica Voinea Ene, “Intimplari Straini la Braila (VIII)” (n-a aparut in serialul publicat in Libertatea (Braila))

Locotenent-colonel dr. Petru Nica:  Eu locuiesc intr-un bloc la care domiciliaza si unii ofiteri din fosta securitate si militie.  E vorba de blocul ,Romarta’ din care, nu-i nici un secret, toata lumea o stie, s-a tras asupra demonstrantilor din piata si asupra aparatorilor Consilului.

Focul s-a executat incepind cu 23 decembrie seara, dar fenomene oarecum bizare au aparut aici cu 4-5 zile inainte.  De pilda pe 18 dupa amiaza, am constatat cu stupoare ca de pe cutiile postale si usile apartamentelor cadrelor Ministerului de Interne au disparut numerele si numele lor.  Sotia mi-a spus sa le stergem si noi.  I-am interzis.  N-aveam de ce ne ascunde.  Apoi, dupa consemnul asta, cine stie ce persoane ti-ar fi putut intra in casa.  Alta bizarie:  boxele respectivelor au fost camuflate cu table, cartoane si alte materiale, sa nu se vada ce-i in interior.  Un du-te-vina la fel de inexplicabil a constat familia mea la aceste apartamente; in conditiile in care, se stie, si ei ca si noi erau in alarma de pe 17 decembrie 1989.  Ca sa nu mai vorbesc de lazi suspecte, care nu aparusera pina atunci…

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (12),” Libertatea (Braila), 27 decembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 2.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/pregatirile-pentru-luptele-de-dupa-22-inainte-de-22/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/procurorul-ioan-dan-procurorul-teodor-ungureanu-si-braila-in-decembrie-1989-i/

Subinginer Nicu Preda:  Ciudat e ca n-am gasit tuburi la fata locului, dar de pe jos, unde ricosasera gloantele, am putut aduna proiectile de o factura deosebita, calibru mic, ascutite la virf.  Le-am predat procurorului militar.

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (5),” Libertatea (Braila), 5 noiembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 3.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/